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1  The Unhealthy Underside of 
Narratives 




My life, it seems to me, is ridiculously shapeless. I know what makes a good 
narrative, and lives don’t make much of that - pattern and balance, form, 
completion, commensurateness. It is often the case that a Life, at least to start 
with, will resemble a success story; but the only shape that life dependably 





Elsewhere (Craib, 2000) I have talked about narratives as a form of bad faith, 
and I want to extend that analysis here in a more concrete way and suggest that 
far from narrative and life being that same ‘thing’ (a la Bruner) they are very 
different ‘things’ and, further, that the relationship between narrative, life and 
health is not the one we might expect. We might expect that narratives are 
good for us, that they help us get our lives together, make sense of where we 
are and enable us to go forward. Indeed this is so obvious that - as we see from 
a paper delivered at this conference - when people receive bad news, a 
diagnosis of multiple sclerosis, helpers set out to provide them with a narrative 
that will enable them to be strong and look hopefully at the future. 
 In this paper I want to argue against such a position; it is my contention 
that some narratives can help people in certain situations but more important, 
narratives, and perhaps especially the best intentioned of accounts that are 
offered by people in the caring professions, can function to keep people in 
passive positions, inhibit possible change and separate people from the 
authenticity of their lives. I am sympathetic to Martin Amis’s suggestion, that 
if there is such a thing as a shared feature of authentic narratives, it lies, at least 
in the modern Western world, in our common experience of tragedy. I will use 
some examples from my own practice as a psychotherapist to illustrate the 
counter productive nature of some narratives. 
 
 





Narratives and Explanations 
 
I commented in my earlier paper on the way in which ‘narrative’ seems to be 
used to cover a range of different types of account, the differences between 
which are more important than their similarities. One contrast I used was 
Bruner’s discussion of narrative as a form which could bind people into their 
cultures and an empirical sociologist’s use of the term ‘causal narrative’ to 
describe a statistical analysis of the relationship between class position and 
health in the course of a life time. I am still struck by this contrast because of 
their opposing dimensions. Bruner is the theorist of meaning, rejoicing in 
peoples’ elaborations of their accounts of their lives. The empirical sociologist 
was using the same term to describe a statistical relationship of which the 
people concerned are not necessarily conscious at all. 
 When I was thinking about this paper I came across another example of 
what I think of as a slippage in the use of ‘narrative’. This was in an editorial in 
The British Journal of Psychiatry by the psychoanalyst and attachment theorist 
Jeremy Holmes, entitled Psychodynamics, narrative and ‘intentional causality’ 
(Holmes, 1998). Holmes argues that when patients presents for psychotherapy, 
they tell their story, describing a sequence of events and statements about why 
these events happen. In what he calls ‘scientific medicine’, the doctor only 
takes notice of the former, and regards it as his task to discover the latter. 
However in everyday life, statements about why things happen are 
commonplace: 
 
Narrative explanations are part of a network of representations of the self and the 
world which provide a causal map which guides action and enables social 
relationships to run smoothly. (Holmes, 1998:279) 
 
 Psychodynamic accounts are narrative accounts which go beyond 
consciousness. Holmes’s concern is with the narratives of attachment theory. 
He takes up Main’s analysis of four different types of narrative corresponding 
to different types of attachment pattern (Main, 1995). The details of this do not 
matter here. What is important is Holmes’s conclusion that narrative patterns 
reflect inner representations of patterns of relationships and these in turn stem 
from early parent - child interaction and predict future behaviour. For my 
purpose, this is the important point (although it is by no means Holmes’s main 
point, which has to do with the relationship between intentionality and 
causality). 
 What Holmes does is make the same movement in the use of ‘narrative’ in 
one argument that I identified in the difference between the empirical 
sociologist and Jerome Bruner. He moves between talking about the narrative 
as a meaning creation, the telling of the story which is ignored by scientific 
medicine, and a causal explanation of patterns of relationship, and of the 




expression of patterns of relationship, of which the person involved is not 
necessarily aware. It is my contention that these two sides, the narrative 
account that one gives of one’s life, and causal processes of which one is 
unconscious are irreconcilable. The irreconcilability is something  with which 
sociology has been struggling for over a century. It is also at the centre of 
Holmes argument, which is similar to an argument in philosophy about reasons 
and causes, which has never been subtle enough to grasp the complexities of 
human motivation (Benton and Craib, 2001). 
 Why this movement from one form of explanation to another? My 
suggestion is that it is the need to have a coherent narrative which is seen as the 
same thing as a full explanation. Holmes says that Freud thought of the 
neurotic symptom as a gap in a narrative which was to be restored by 
psychoanalysis. 
 What do I mean by a ‘coherent narrative’? I think this comes clearly from 
Bruner’s research into peoples’ stories. A narrative is always part of a larger 
whole, usually falling into an easily recognisable form. It has a sort of reflexive 
rhetorical dimension, in which the narrator justifies him or her self, and 
predictive dimensions: if I say that I was a particular type of child, then it is 
likely to mean that I will say that I am a similar type of adult. Narratives 
construct and bind together in a way that is a fundamental precondition for 
human life: 
 
… human beings, in interacting with one another, form a sense of the canonical 
and ordinary as a background against which to interpret and give meaning to 
breaches in and deviations from “normal” states of the human condition. Such 
narrative explications have the effect of framing the idiosyncratic in a “lifelike” 
fashion that can promote negotiation and avoid confrontational disruption and 
strife … 
 This method of negotiating and renegotiating meanings by the mediation of 
narrative interpretation is, it seems to me, one of the crowning achievements of 
human development in the ontogenetic, cultural and phylogenetic sense of that 
expression. (Bruner, 1990:67) 
 
 Narratives and the ability to construct and interpret narratives are, then, not 
just important, they are fundamentally important. In fact one could say from 
Bruner’s account that they comprise human life itself. They keep human life in 
order, enabling the negotiation of differences and the maintenance of a sense of 
normality. Many people come into psychotherapy wanting such a narrative, 
believing that if they can discover why they are like they are, then they can do 
something about it. 
 
 





The Roots of Narrative 
 
The first time I came across an argument that things might not be so simple 
was in an article by Toril Moi on Freud’s case study Dora: Fragments of an 
Analysis. This was an unsuccessful analysis and Moi comments on Freud’s 
distress that he could not present a full analysis, a full narrative, but she goes 
on to suggest that this is a specifically male way of looking at the problem. In 
what would now probably be called an ‘essentialist’ account, she suggests that 
a linear, complete argument is a form of masculine thinking, whereas a 
fragmented, open more circular account is a form of feminine thinking, both 
with clear metaphorical, or perhaps even firmer, relationships, to male and 
female genitalia. (Bernheimer and Kahane, 1985) So, perhaps a coherent 
narrative might not be an entirely good thing. In that case, how do we explain 
the force of the insistence on the importance of coherent narrative in the 
theorists who employ the concept, psychotherapy patients who desire such a 
narrative and indeed most other people who want to know why something 
happens to them. 
 Perhaps we need to look at what it might be like to experience life without 
narratives. I can think of  two situations that are relevant, although I am sure 
there are more (I do not know enough about brain damage or learning 
difficulties to be able to comment on these). The two that spring to my mind 
are pre-natal and early post-natal experience and, at the other end of life, any of 
the forms of senile dementia. 
 A narrative implies movement; I was going to write forward movement, 
and that might almost be taken for granted in the modern world, but I see no 
reason why it should not involve circular or cyclical movement; why should 
we not talk of the narrative of the seasons, for example. Indeed linear 
narratives are comparatively recent in human history, perhaps emerging with 
Christ but not necessarily becoming a common experience of the world until 
the ‘modern’ became a valued category in the Western world (Kumar, 1994). 
Anyway, it seems to me a commonplace that there are different types of 
movement and, further that movement involves change. 
 Now it is possible to surmise that the major and most dramatic changes in 
the infant’s life comes with the slow outgrowing of the safety of the womb and 
the comparatively fast journey down the birth canal, until the last century the 
most dangerous short journey that most humans would take; conceivably, 
unless the foetus is acquainted with the advances of modern medicine, it 
remains the most dangerous journey that most of us will experience, and it will 
be followed by many other new and therefore dangerous experiences. So, if 
movement and narrative imply each other, then movement, danger and 
narrative imply each other. 
 At the other end of life, I have spent the last year watching my mother sink 
into dementia. I am aware that this must take different people in different ways 




- presumably depending amongst other things on which parts of the brain are 
destroyed in which order. My mother’s ability to turn her life into well leant 
and familiar narratives had been declining for some time, and over this last 
year it has disappeared all together. In so far as I could get close to what she 
was experiencing as the process became worse, it involved a sense of being 
someone, and of having bits of history, but no sense of who or how the bits 
fitted together. My feeling when I was with her was that she knew she was 
somewhere although she couldn’t really grasp where, and that she had to do 
something or be somewhere else, although she did not know what or where. 
She would try filling these gaps with characters or places that came from her 
childhood or adolescence, but the comfort that these attempts bought her would 
last only for seconds. At the time of writing even minimal attempts at narrative 
construction are declining and she is resorting to a sort of chanting, rather like 
a child’s word play, which uses names for her childhood but for their noise 
sounds rather than their sense. The worse she has become the more determined 
the chanting has become, and the more desperate the feeling that she passes on 
to me when I am with her - although to bring the story right up to date, a 
medication has been found that seems to take the edge off the panic. 
 
 
Narratives as Containers and Defences 
 
I will return to this aspect of her behaviour later. For the moment I want to note 
that these two ends of human existence are both characterised by the absence 
of coherent narrative, and the potentiality for extreme bouts of panic or 
sustained fear. It is this which perhaps lies behind the power that theorists of 
narrative grant narratives. In terms of contemporary psychoanalytic thinking, 
narrative forms provide a holding or containing function, relieving the anxiety 
of not knowing. From this point we can go in two directions. The first is 
towards existentialism - the direction I took in my earlier paper. Then I argued 
that some forms of narrative are forms of bad faith in that they are ways of 
denying or avoiding responsibility for one’s actions. What I am arguing here 
has a wider connection with existentialism, or at least with Sartre’s 
existentialism which I find most useful, and I want to follow this through for a 
while. The force of Sartre’s philosophy is that we cannot look to anything 
outside ourselves for justification, or for meaning. My life is meaningless until 
I give it meaning by my choices. He shares with Bruner the view that human 
beings are creators of meaning, but there is one essential difference. We are 
each, individually creators of our own meaning and to adopt cultural narratives 
is to lose individual meaning in a shared account which leaves me no different 
from others. That is a form of bad faith in a rather wider sense than I spoke 
about before: I let others give form to the  meaning of my life. 





 I am sympathetic to this argument but I think that the argument is too easy 
and the morality too harsh. The argument is too easy because it does not 
account of the emotional conflicts and resistances that are generated in the 
attempt to take responsibility for one’s life, the difficulty of living 
authentically; the morality is too harsh because it seems to leave us where we 
are - along the lines of ‘you’ve made your bed and now you must lie in it’. 
That of course is always true but we don’t necessarily have to stay in the same 
bed until we die. I have occasionally heard a statement along the lines of ‘It’s 
what I chose’ used as a form of rather resentful resignation. 
 I think we get further into the nature of narratives if we approach it from a 
psychoanalytic perspective. I think Holmes, and perhaps Freud as well if he 
thought this, is mistaken, when he says the neurotic symptom is an eruption 
into a narrative, the coherence of which can be restored. I think Freud’s model 
of the psyche is more compatible with the idea that the unconscious is a 
continuous eruption into consciousness and we are engaged in a constant battle 
to keep it under some sort of control; we are internally divided against 
ourselves with conflicts of which we are not necessarily aware at all - so much 
so that it is often difficult to distinguish between what is neurotic and what is 
not. Indeed it is difficult to distinguish between a structure of a neurosis and 
the structure of a satisfactory sublimation. Both involve the repression of a 
forbidden desire, the latter involving the redirection of energy into something 
considered acceptable to the individual or society, the former involving the 
redirection of energy into something unacceptable to society. Thus whether an 
activity is neurotic or not for psychoanalysis often seems to depend on current 
social attitudes as much as individual misery which is there in both cases. My 
point here is that it is simply too easy to think of curing symptoms, producing 
coherent narratives. 
 It is instructive to think about the role of narrative in Freud’s discussion of 
dreamwork. Free association traces back the processes of condensation, 
displacement and symbolisation that the sleeping psyche works through to 
protect itself and this is the way in which, in the process of psychotherapy, we 
begin to explore the multiple meanings of dream symbols. But there is a further 
process that Freud calls ‘secondary revision’ - as we approach the end of sleep 
we organise the dream symbols into a story, a narrative. This shows both the 
profound connection between the psyche and narratives and the function of 
narratives within the psyche. Freud saw secondary revision as a form of 
defence, a way in which the psyche hides the unconscious meaning  of the 
dream symbol. 
 Most, if not all, the therapists I talk to about this also see the dream story as 
important in understanding the dream and I am inclined to agree with them. 
Anything that the psyche produces will have some meaning at an unconscious 
level, but this does not mean that it is not a defence and a necessary defence for 
the dreamer. Like all defences it points towards and keeps the person away 




from their unconscious. Now for Freud one of the major features of the 
unconscious is its disorganisation - its refusal to follow the laws of logic, its 
failure to recognise time - its timelessness - and the urgency of unconscious 
desires. The properties of the unconscious stand starkly opposed to the 
properties of narrative, which involve progression, connection and coherence. 
 
 
Some Examples of Restrictive Narratives 
 
Perhaps, then it is best to regard narratives as defences: they enable us to 
survive in the world unless they become too comprehensive and inclusive, 
when they cease to be able to contain the disruptive flow of our internal world. 
There are many such narratives around in a psychotherapy group and here I 
want to offer a rough classification of the ones I am most familiar with from 
my own practice. 
 Perhaps the most common narrative is the victim narrative: I am like I am 
because I have been mistreated, abused in some way by my parents or some 
other significant adult - it has ruined my life and I have been unable to recover. 
I often think of this particular narrative as part of a wider ‘fairy tale narrative’ 
in which there is also a villain and a hero. It is obvious who the villain is and 
much energy is spent hating him or her and trying to mobilise the group behind 
the hate, which of course prohibits both thinking and understanding, not to 
mention change. Any change has to come from the hero, and often the mantel 
of the hero is laid on the psychotherapist who inevitably fails, confirming the 
patient in his or her tortured victim state. The victim role is a passive role so 
the patients who are victims tend, in my experience, to remain patients - even 
when they learn to see themselves as survivors, an elaboration of this narrative 
whereby their victimhood can become the basis for a profession. It becomes 
difficult to seek a life outside of the role This comes across very clearly in 
Elaine’s book Hystories (Showalter, 1997). 
 Secondly, referring back to Holmes, there is the attachment narrative. I 
once had a patient who had spent a large part of his life in one form of therapy 
or another, having picked up early on the idea that his problems stemmed from 
the fact that his mother had to go into hospital for a fairly lengthy period in his 
early infancy. He did indeed seem unable to move in his life or form 
meaningful attachments and I think he was caught up in some inner stasis, 
waiting for his mother to come back and correct the situation. The part of him 
that wanted to go forward would push him towards a new attempt at therapy, 
but as he got older it seemed that to recognise his own contribution towards his 
position would also mean recognising that a large part of his life has been 
wasted and he could have done something about it. By the time he came to me 
I had the sense that he came back to therapy to prove to himself that nothing 
could be done. 





 Both of these examples point to the idea that instead of adopting a more or 
less complete narrative of what has happened, which can easily pin me down to 
the position I am in, and for which I sought psychotherapy in the first place, I 
should be finding a way of creating my own narrative. But the creation of 
narrative also has its roblems. Certainly I need to look for my own 
responsibility for what I am, for what I have done with my life, but it is not a 
simple lesson. I need to learn what I am responsible for in my life and what I 
am not responsible for. It is not my fault that my mother died when I was a few 
years old, even though I might have spent much of my life blaming myself. 
However, I am responsible for at least some of what I have made of that 
tragedy. One of my patients suggested a useful metaphor: that we are dealt a 
hand of cards at birth, and the hand may be good or bad, but in the long run it 
is how we play our hand that matters. 
 This leads to another restrictive narrative: that in some absolute sense I am 
entirely responsible for my own life, the omnipotent narrative. I write my own 
stories. When this narrative is bought into a therapy group it creates a difficult 
dilemma: I come to increase my control over my life but the only way I can 
learn about myself is to acknowledge that others might know more about me 
than I do myself. Finally there is the ‘rational’ narrative, one that Freud took up 
sometimes when talking about psychoanalysis - the narrative embraced in the 
phrase ‘where id was, there ego shall be’, and the idea often heard amongst 
patients, that ‘if I can find out why I feel like this the I will get better’. The two 
are not quite the same, because I think Freud was envisaging an emotional 
change as well as a change in what I know about myself, but the rational 
defence seems to remain only at an intellectual level: I will feel happiest when 
the therapeutic session resembles a seminar. 
 
 
The Importance of Multiple and Incomplete Stories 
 
Where are we now? I have suggested a number of narratives, about lives and 
about psychotherapy which make sense of what the people involved are 
experiencing but which, because they are coherent narratives, prohibit learning 
- a narrative does not necessarily liberate a person, it can trap him or her and 
the more coherent and reasonable the narrative, the more likely it is to trap the 
person. Adam Phillips actually makes my point in a very clear way when he 
says in a discussion of Freud and T. S. Eliot: 
 
What Fred and Eliot are saying, in their different ways, is that the pressures we 
live under seem to put pressure on us to make them intelligible. That to be human 
in the best sense is to have some understanding - to be able to give some kind of 
account - of what we are suffering from … And yet (both) point us in two 
directions at once. At their most reassuring they tell us that not wholly 




understanding what we utter … can lead us in the fullness of time, to a more 
profound apprehension of what is only a concealed intelligibilty. 
 (Phillips, 2002:103) 
 
 I think that even Phillips is too optimistic here, saying in effect that if we 
give up meaning-jam today we will get more and better meaning jam 
tomorrow. This of course never happens in politics, but I think it probably does 
sometimes happen in our psychological life. However this brings us up against 
Martin Amis, who seems to me to be saying that, in the society we live in, 
coherent meaning is not available because the life we have to make sense of is 
incoherent. One could trace this as part of the development of modernity, or as 
I would prefer, late capitalism, seen by Marx over 150 years ago: 
 
Constant revolutionising of production, uninterrupted disturbance of all social 
conditions, everlasting uncertainty and agitation distinguish the bourgeois epoch 
from all earlier ones. All fixed fast frozen relations, with their train of ancient and 
venerable prejudices and opinions, are swept away, all ne formed ones become 
antiquated before they can ossify. All that is solid melts into air, all that is holy is 
profaned …. (Marx, 1968:739) 
 
 What I am suggesting, in a very quick and crude way, is the disruptions in 
the outside world are perhaps beginning to match the normal disruptions in the 
unconscious world, and the social sciences are becoming concerned with 
narratives when narratives are becoming more and more difficult to construct. 
However it is not only the outside world that makes things difficult. There is a 
further existential contribution to the disruption that is implicit in Martin 
Amis’s account, which comes after a long description of his father’s death: ‘the 
only shape that life dependably exhibits is that of tragedy’ However big a fish I 
become in my little pond the certainty (for 99.9 recurring % of the population) 
is that I will vanish and be forgotten in the space of two generations. And 
whatever my achievements in my life, my carefully nurtured abilities will fade 
more or less quickly as I die. Some people seem to become immobilised by this 
possibility - the production of meaning becomes pointless. A few pages before 
the quotation above Phillips refers to a level of terror and mystery in our lives 
that cannot be analysed and I would suggest that it is here that death lurks. 
Paradoxically death also lurks in the coherent narrative, which, I would 
suggest, is often constructed to guard against that terror. This was identified by 
Kierkegaard, not writing about narratives as such but writing about what 
happens when we, or more appropriately here, I, deny the reality of my own 
death. If I am to be open to the world, to new experiences, then I will be have 
to be open all the time to the possibility of my death. Being open to the world 
means being open to change, and if things change, they pass and cease to exist; 
change makes me aware that I will pass and cease to exist. If I cut myself off 
from experience, then there is a sense in which I cease to exist whilst I stay 





alive. As Phillips also points out in the discussion of Eliot and Freud, both saw 
this level of terror, of madness as a source of creativity, of life. Without it, I 
become one of the living dead. All forms of psychotherapy need to be very 
careful about this; some get very close to an attempt to ‘teach’ a narrative that 
denies the experience that the patient brings as his or her problem rather than 
understand it. 
 When this happens it is the result of two forces: the terror in the therapist 
and the terror in the patient. It is important however that the non-
psychoanalytic social science researcher become aware of these pressures: that 
the people we interview will produce the stories we want to here and we will 
accept those stories because the alternative is too difficult and painful to 
contemplate. We should think of the relationship between narrative and health 
not as the simple coherent narrative that most people seem to think it as being. 
I would prefer not use the term health at all but to talk in terms of a person’s 
ability to articulate their experience. This might require a number of different, 
perhaps contradictory narratives, each of which will have gaps, fault lines of 
various descriptions, ambiguous beginnings and possibilities of any number of 
conclusions. 
 As a coda, I want to return to what I said about my mother’s dementia, my 
mother struggling with her fear of the world and what is happening to her 
mind. It is important to be able imagine ourselves lost in our own inner 
experience, gabbling away as we search for a non-existent narrative hold. 
There is something important about being aware of these depths as a part of our 
humanity - every so often, perhaps, we need to turn over a narrative and see 
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